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Unwinding: A Tale of Corridors and Floors 
 
Monetary policy in market economies has been extraordinary by historical standards for almost 
a decade. Following the 2008 financial crisis, central banks throughout the world expanded 
their balance sheets, in some cases by a factor of four or more. Historically, central banks 
purchased safe assets. Beginning in 2009, they began to purchase risky assets, a policy that 
would have struck fear in the hearts of their prudent predecessors. Central bankers are now 
considering a return to more normal times, a task they refer to as ‘unwinding’. How should 
unwinding be accomplished?  This article discusses the options.  
 
Two questions I ask and answer are first: should the Bank of England continue with its current 
policy of paying interest on reserves and flooding the system with liquidity? This is called a 
‘floor system’. Or should it revert to its former policy of paying zero interest on reserves and 
restricting domestic credit to control the interest rate? This called a ‘corridor system’. And 
second: should the Bank retain long-dated and risky assets on its balance sheet? Or should it 
revert to a traditional policy of holding only safe assets? 
 
The Bank of England has at least six distinct policy tools at its disposal. Three of these tools have 
been used for centuries: Three are new. The six tools are: 
1. The Required Reserve Ratio. This is the fraction of its liabilities that a commercial bank is 
required to hold as reserves with the Bank of England. From 1971 through 1980 the 
required reserve ratio was 1.5%. From 1981 through 2009, commercial banks set their 
own individual reserve targets. Since 2009, the required reserve ratio in the UK has been 
equal to zero. 
2. The Penalty Rate. This is the interest rate at which the Bank of England is willing to lend 
to commercial banks. Because this rate is higher than the rate at which commercial 
banks borrow from each other in the inter-bank market, I refer to it as RPenalty. 
3. High Powered Money. This is the quantity of notes in circulation plus the reserves of 
commercial banks with the Bank of England. The Bank changes high powered money 
through operations in the inter-bank money market.  
Tools 1 through 3 have been used to operate monetary policy in market economies 
since the inception of central banking in the seventeenth century. Tools 4 through 6 are 
new. 
4. The Reserve Rate. This is the interest rate paid by the Bank of England on reserves of 
commercial banks held on deposit with the Bank of England. Historically, this rate was 
zero but, after the 2008 financial crisis, it is positive and it is potentially now a separate 
tool of Bank policy. 
5. Risk Composition. Historically the Bank of England held only very safe assets; 
predominantly short duration treasury liabilities. After the 2008 financial crisis the Bank 
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purchased treasury assets of longer duration. It also bailed out commercial banks by 
accepting risky assets of uncertain value in return for lending them money. 
6. Forward Guidance. This refers to the communication strategy of the Bank and it 
emerged as a topic of interest when a prominent academic (Woodford 2012) suggested 
that the method by which the Bank communicates its policy to the public can be used as 
an independent tool to manage expectations. It is my personal opinion that this tool is 
useful as a means of communicating the views of central bankers to the public but it is 
unlikely to be effective as an independent tool unless backed up by active asset market 
intervention in some more concrete form. 
Historically the Bank operated by paying zero interest on reserves and it influenced the interest 
rate in the inter-bank market by collateralized borrowing or lending. Under this operating 
system, the Bank lends money to a commercial bank for a short period in the “repo market”, 
accepting private assets as collateral. The commercial bank agrees to repurchase the collateral 
at a predetermined price at a date in the future that may vary between one day and several 
weeks. By varying the scope of its activities in this market the Bank of England influences the 
quantity of liquid funds available to the commercial banking system.  
Monetary Policy in a Corridor System 
Figure 1, plots central bank liabilities on the horizontal axis and the interest rate in the 
interbank market on the vertical axis.1  The downward sloping curve is the demand for reserves 
by commercial banks: It slopes down because a prudent commercial bank will choose to hold 
excess reserves as a 
precaution to allow for 
unforeseen contingencies 
(Keister and McAndrews 
2008). The inter-bank rate is 
the opportunity cost of 
precautionary reserves. The 
demand-for-reserves slopes 
down because, as the 
opportunity cost of 
precautionary reserves 
increases, the demand for 
these reserves falls.  
The upper horizontal line at 
RPenalty is the interest rate at 
which the Bank of England is 
willing to lend to commercial banks. The lower line at RReserves is the rate the Bank pays on 
reserves held by commercial banks at the Bank of England. RPenalty places a ceiling on the inter-
bank rate. RReserves places a floor on the inter-bank rate. Variations in the quantity of reserves in 
the system cause variations in the inter-bank rate within the corridor set by RReserves and RPenalty.   
                                                        
1 See Keister (2012) and Clews et al (2010) for a discussion of the UK case. 
 
Figure 1: Monetary Policy in a Corridor System  
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In the UK prior to 2008 the Bank operated a corridor system in which RReserves was equal to zero. 
The Monetary Policy Committee set RPolicy based on its assessment of economic conditions and 
the trading desk of the Bank operated in the repo market to target the overnight value of Bank 
liabilities. Figure 1, illustrates this method of operation. By varying HA, the Bank can implement 
any desired policy rate in the corridor defined by RPenalty and RReserves. 
 
Monetary Policy in a Floor System 
Figure 2 illustrates the operation of monetary policy in a “floor system” of the kind operated in 
the UK since 2009 (Bank of England 2015). Following the 2008 financial crisis the Bank of 
England expanded its balance sheet from £100b in 2008 to over £400b in the autumn of 2014. 
High powered money increased from HA in Figure 1 to HB in Figure 2. The policy rate was 
lowered and set equal to the Reserve Rate, currently equal to one quarter of one percent. This 
change in policy is referred to 
as ‘Quantitative Easing’. 
 
In addition to expanding the 
size of its balance sheet, the 
Bank of England, along with 
other world central banks, 
changed the risk composition 
of its assets by purchasing 
long-dated treasury securities 
and by accepting the 
liabilities of failing banks as 
collateral for its loans. 
Historically, central bank 
balance sheets have 
consisted of short-term assets or of short-term loans to the private sector that are guaranteed 
by high quality collateral. A policy that operates through changes in the risk composition of the 
Bank’s balance sheet is referred to as ‘Qualitative Easing’ (Buiter 2008). 
 
How to Unwind 
How should the Bank of England operate moving forwards? The first decision is: when should 
the Bank of England raise the Policy Rate? The conventional answer to this question is; keep an 
eye on economic activity and begin to increase the interest rate if inflation begins to emerge or, 
if output growth begins to increase above the sustainable long-run potential growth rate. The 
inflation rate in the UK has been increasing steadily for more than two years and that signal, in 
my opinion, will likely lead the MPC to raise the policy rate at its next meeting. 
 
When the Monetary Policy Committee decides to raise the interest rate, it will face two 
additional questions. Should the Bank continue with a floor system in which it raises the 
Reserve Rate and retains a large balance sheet? Or should it contract its balance sheet to the 
point where the policy rate increases above the Reserve Rate. The Federal Reserve in the 
 
Figure 2: Monetary Policy in a Floor System  
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United States has already begun monetary tightening and they have chosen the former route. 
In my view, the Bank of England will follow the Fed’s lead. 
 
My first recommendation is that the Bank should maintain a floor system. This is the right policy 
because liquidity has zero social cost but positive social benefit (Friedman, 1969). By raising the 
Policy Rate and the Reserve Rate at the same time the Bank of England will increase the interest 
rate without, at the same time, restricting credit. If the real interest rate is determined by 
factors beyond the control of monetary policy, as many economists believe, an increase in the 
nominal interest rate will be consistent with the Bank’s remit of bringing CPI inflation back in 
line with the 2% target.  Running a floor system implies that the Bank should maintain a large 
balance sheet into the indefinite future. 
 
My second recommendation is that the Bank of England should retain a large fraction of its 
balance sheet in the form of risky assets and that it should systematically alter the magnitude of 
this fraction to stabilize asset prices. This recommendation, which I explained in detail in my 
book Prosperity for All, (Farmer 2016), is designed to promote financial stability and it 
represents a complement to alternative policies that have the same goal; for example, counter-
cyclical credit buffers.  
 
I propose that the Bank should engage in counter-cyclical asset trades by buying and selling 
shares in an index fund with the goal of preventing bubbles and crashes. My proposal is based 
on the proposition that asset price fluctuations are inefficient in a very specific sense. 
 
I am not claiming that an average investor can make money by buying and selling equities. The 
idea that a private investor cannot make money by trading in the asset markets is called 
“informational efficiency” and that proposition is correct, at least to a first approximation. But 
the Bank of England is not a private investor. It is the agent of the Treasury and its trades are 
backed by the financial wealth not just of those of us alive today, but by our children and our 
grandchildren. As I argued in evidence presented to the Treasury Select Committee, the 
Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England can, and should, use the risk composition of 
its asset portfolio to prevent bubbles from arising in the first place (Farmer 2017).  And by 
stepping in when markets crash, the Bank can head off a financial panic before it happens.  
 
Conclusion 
It’s a brave new world and, to quote Dorothy from the Wizard of Oz, ‘We’re not in Kansas 
anymore’. Every major crisis has the potential to teach us more about the word in which we live 
and every previous crisis has been a crucible for the development of a new institution or a new 
idea. The 2008 financial crisis will, in my view, be no exception. The tools I have discussed in 
this article, if used wisely, offer the prospect of a brighter future.   
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